Out of Egypt
Article
from The New Republic 11/05/2001
by Peter Beinart
Last month the Nobel Committee did something completely useless:
It awarded its Peace Prize to Kofi Annan and the United Nations.
Was it the UN's anti-racism conference--with its agenda formulated
largely in Tehran--that won over the committee? Or perhaps
Annan's personal accomplishments--for instance his role, as
head of UN peacekeeping in 1995, in pulling blue helmets out
of Srebrenica so the Serbs could rape and murder the city's
residents without international interference?
The Nobel Peace Prize has value only when it embarrasses a
government by focusing attention on some ugly pocket of repression
it would like the world to ignore. Desmond Tutu's Peace Prize
in 1984 helped fuel the global anti-apartheid movement. Aung
San Suu Kyi's in 1991 made Myanmar a human rights cause célèbre.
Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and José Ramos-Horta's in
1996 made it harder for Indonesia to cover up its brutality
in East Timor. And the Nobel Committee could have embarrassed
exactly the right government this year had it chosen jailed
Egyptian academic Saad Eddin Ibrahim.
Ibrahim, an internationally respected sociologist, was sentenced
to seven years in prison this May on a number of trumped up
charges that amount to this: He challenged Hosni Mubarak to
hold free elections, respect Egypt's Coptic Christian minority,
and make real peace with Israel. He is exactly the kind of
person Arab governments want the world to ignore--because
he exposes just how vicious and corrupt they really are. And
he is exactly the kind of person the world--and particularly
the U.S.--needs to champion if we want to win the war on terrorism.
The United States today faces the same dilemma it faced over
and over during the cold war. Some of our supposed allies
in the war against terrorism--Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan--violate
the very democratic principles we are fighting to defend.
But the fundamentalists they repress are even more illiberal
and certainly more hostile to the United States. So, as with
cold war autocracies like Chile and the Philippines, the United
States must now decide whether to back pro-Western Muslim
tyrannies--and thus earn their people's wrath--or push democracy
and gamble that it will produce more stable, and more honorable,
allies in the long run.
Right now we are emphatically doing the former. No senior
U.S. official has publicly mentioned Ibrahim's case, and Mubarak's
government boasts that September 11 has vindicated its grizzly
crackdown on political dissent. "After these horrible
crimes committed in New York and Virginia," said Egyptian
Prime Minister Atef Abeid, "maybe Western countries should
begin to think of Egypt's own fight [against] terror as their
new model."
Egypt's "fight against terror" consists of special
military courts, routine torture, the imprisonment of opposition
politicians, and an emergency law that has been in place since
1981. And, in some ways, it has worked. Islamist terrorism
has decreased sharply since the mid-1990s (although partly
through export to Afghanistan and the West). Most of Egypt's
remaining Osama bin Ladens are in jail.
The problem is that's where Ibrahim is as well. It was Egypt's
emergency law, which the government justifies as a weapon
against fundamentalists, that put him behind bars before charges
were even filed. A 1992 law, passed to prevent foreign Islamists
from funneling money into the country, allowed the government
to prosecute Ibrahim for receiving a grant from the European
Union. And at trial he sat in the same kind of public cage
that confined the fundamentalist assassins of Anwar Sadat.
What Ibrahim's plight makes clear is that when a government
abandons the rule of law in its fight against fundamentalists,
it usually abandons it altogether. So while it's true that
Egypt's crackdown has crippled Islamic terrorism, it has also
crippled Egypt's civil society. In the wake of Ibrahim's arrest,
some local NGOs, which had relied on foreign funding, have
shut down. And as a result there was no effective independent
monitoring of last year's parliamentary elections. Under the
emergency law, the government has also detained labor activists
critical of working conditions at state-owned companies. As
Fouad Ajami has written, "The terror had given Mubarak
a splendid alibi and an escape from the demands put forth
by segments of the middle class and its organizations in the
professional syndicates--the lawyers, the engineers, and the
journalists--for a measure of political participation."
And, of course, the lack of political participation means
greater corruption, which means greater poverty, which plays
into the Islamists' hands.
The "fight against terror" has devastated Egyptian
civil society in another way as well. To compensate for the
lack of political freedom, Mubarak has given fundamentalists
unprecedented control over Egypt's educational system and
cultural life. Books considered offensive to Islam are banned
and their authors arrested. This July, 52 alleged homosexuals
were put on trial for "contempt for religion." Entire
schools have banned the Egyptian flag and national anthem
as symbols of secularism. Saudi Arabia has done something
similar, handing over its schools to militant clerics in an
effort to buy them off. To preserve themselves today the regimes
are sowing the seeds of a theocratic future.
In other words, Hosni Mubarak is destroying Egypt in order
to save it. And the United States is blithely playing along.
But there is another way--more dangerous in the short run,
perhaps, but safer over the long haul: It is Saad Ibrahim's
way. Ibrahim is a liberal and a secularist--just the kind
of person that Egypt's Islamists have targeted for assassination.
And yet, after intensively studying the fundamentalists, he
says Egypt should respect their rights--jailing only those
who advocate violence and allowing more moderate Islamists
to participate freely in politics, in the hope that the democratic
process will wean them from their more bloodthirsty brethren.
What Ibrahim believes, and Mubarak does not, is that liberal
democracy--if given a chance--will prove more attractive to
Egypt's suffering, embittered people than the confinement
of sharia and the fantasy of jihad. And the real question
for the United States as it enters this new era is whether
we believe that too. Even before September 11, intellectuals
and politicians called America's post-cold-war campaign for
democracy a hubristic delusion. During the second presidential
debate, George W. Bush explained, "I just don't think
it's the role of the United States to walk into a country
and say, `We do it this way, so should you.'" The Muslim
world, in particular, was deemed culturally incapable of democracy.
Just not up to it. Guys like Mubarak, the right-wing relativists
argued, with an air of resignation, are the best they can
do.
After September 11 those arguments really matter--they define
the moral framework within which America goes to war. Is our
alternative to Osama bin Laden Hosni Mubarak, or is it Saad
Eddin Ibrahim? And if it's the former, does anyone seriously
think we can win?
PETER
BEINART is the Editor of TNR.