In the last year (2003) NORPAC has actively lobbied for Congressional
hearings and action on the problem of Saudi Arabia's central
role in terrorism. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives
have since had those hearings. We are please to announce that
Senator SPECTER along with Senators COLLINS, SCHUMER, GRAHAM
of South Carolina, WYDEN, COLLINS, GRAHAM of Florida, and
BAYH have introduced the Saudi Arabia Accountability Act.
We applaud the this long overdue action and would ask our
members to call their Senators and ask them to Cosponsor this
bill.
Saudi Arabia Accountability Act of 2003 (Introduced
in Senate)
S
1888 IS
108th
CONGRESS
1st
Session
S.
1888
To
halt Saudi support for institutions that fund, train, incite,
encourage,
or in any other way aid and abet terrorism, and to secure full
Saudi
cooperation in the investigation of terrorist incidents.
IN
THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
November
18, 2003
Mr. SPECTER (for himself, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. GRAHAM of South Carolina,
Mr.
WYDEN, Ms. COLLINS, Mr. GRAHAM of Florida, and Mr. BAYH) introduced
the
following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee
on
Foreign Relations
-------------------------------------------------------------------
A
BILL
To
halt Saudi support for institutions that fund, train, incite,
encourage,
or in any other way aid and abet terrorism, and to secure full
Saudi
cooperation in the investigation of terrorist incidents.
Be
it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United
States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION
1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the `Saudi Arabia Accountability Act
of 2003'.
SEC.
2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1)
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) mandates
that all
states `refrain from providing any form of support, active or
passive, to
entities or persons involved in terrorist acts', take `the necessary
steps
to prevent the commission of terrorist acts', and `deny safe
haven to those
who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts'.
(2)
The Council on Foreign Relations concluded in an October 2002
report on
terrorist financing that `[f]or years, individuals and charities
based in
Saudi Arabia have been the most important source of funds for
al-Qaeda, and
for years, Saudi officials have turned a blind eye to this problem'.
(3)
The Middle East Media Research Institute concluded in a July
3, 2003,
report on Saudi support for Palestinian terrorists that `for
decades, the
royal family of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been the main
financial
supporter of Palestinian groups fighting Israel'. The report
notes
specifically that Saudi-sponsored organizations have funneled
over
$4,000,000,000 to finance the Palestinian intifada that began
in September
2000.
(4)
Much of this Saudi money has been directed to Hamas and to the
families
of suicide bombers, directly funding and rewarding suicide bombers.
In
December 2000, former Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas
wrote to the
Saudis to complain about their support for Hamas.
(5)
The New York Times, citing United States and Israeli sources,
reported
on September 17, 2003, that at least 50 percent of the current
operating
budget of Hamas comes from `people in Saudi Arabia'.
(6)
Many Saudi-funded religious institutions and the literature
they
distribute teach a message of hate and intolerance that provides
an
ideological basis for anti-Western terrorism. The effects of
these teachings
are evidenced by the fact that Osama bin Laden himself and 15
of the 19
September 11th hijackers were Saudi citizens.
(7)
After the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers housing complex
at Dahran,
Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 United States Air Force personnel
and wounded
approximately 400 people, the Government of Saudi Arabia refused
to allow
United States officials to question individuals held in detention
by the
Saudis in connection with the attack.
(8)
During an October 2002 hearing on financing of terrorism before
the
Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, the Undersecretary
for Enforcement
of the Department of the Treasury testified that the Government
of Saudi
Arabia had taken only `baby steps' toward stemming the financing
of
terrorist activities.
(9)
During a July 2003 hearing on terrorism before the Subcommittee
on
Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security of the Committee
on the
Judiciary of the Senate, David Aufhauser, General Counsel of
the Treasury
Department, stated that Saudi Arabia is, in many cases, the
`epicenter' of
financing for terrorism.
(10)
A joint committee of the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of
Representatives issued a report on July 24, 2003, that quotes
various United
States Government personnel who complained that the Saudis refused
to
cooperate in the investigation of Osama bin Laden and his network
both
before and after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
(11)
There are indications that, since the May 12, 2003, suicide
bombings in
Riyadh, the Government of Saudi Arabia is making a more serious
effort to
combat terrorism.
SEC.
3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1)
it is imperative that the Government of Saudi Arabia immediately
and
unconditionally--
(A)
provide complete, unrestricted, and unobstructed cooperation
to the
United States, including the unsolicited sharing of relevant
intelligence in
a consistent and timely fashion, in the investigation of groups
and
individuals that are suspected of financing, supporting, plotting,
or
committing an act of terror against United States citizens anywhere
in the
world, including within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;
(B)
permanently close all charities, schools, or other organizations
or
institutions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that fund, train,
incite,
encourage, or in any other way aid and abet terrorism anywhere
in the world
(hereafter in this Act referred to as `Saudi-based terror organizations'),
including by means of providing support for the families of
individuals who
have committed acts of terrorism;
(C)
end funding or other support by the Government of Saudi Arabia
for
charities, schools, and any other organizations or institutions
outside the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that train, incite, encourage, or in
any other way
aid and abet terrorism anywhere in the world (hereafter in this
Act referred
to as `offshore terror organizations'), including by means of
providing
support for the families of individuals who have committed acts
of
terrorism; and
(D)
block all funding from private Saudi citizens and entities to
any
Saudi-based terror organization or offshore terrorism organization;
and
(2)
the President, in deciding whether to make the certification
under
section 4, should judge whether the Government of Saudi Arabia
has continued
and sufficiently expanded the efforts to combat terrorism that
it redoubled
after the May 12, 2003, bombing in Riyadh.
SEC.
4. SANCTIONS.
(a) RESTRICTIONS ON EXPORTS AND DIPLOMATIC TRAVEL- Unless the
President
makes the certification described in subsection (c), the President
shall
take the following actions:
(1)
Prohibit the export to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and prohibit
the
issuance of a license for the export to the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, of--
(A)
any defense articles or defense services on the United States
Munitions
List under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
2778) for
which special export controls are warranted under such Act (22
U.S.C. 2751
et seq.); and
(B)
any item identified on the Commerce Control List maintained
under part
774 of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations.
(2)
Restrict travel of Saudi diplomats assigned to Washington, District
of
Columbia, New York, New York, the Saudi Consulate General in
Houston, or the
Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles to a 25-mile radius of Washington,
District
of Columbia, New York, New York, the Saudi Consulate General
in Houston, or
the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, respectively.
(b)
WAIVER- The President may waive the application of subsection
(a) if the
President--
(1)
determines that it is in the national security interest of the
United
States to do so; and
(2)
submits to the appropriate congressional committees a report
that
contains the reasons for such determination.
(c)
CERTIFICATION- The President shall transmit to the appropriate
congressional committees a certification of any determination
made by the
President after the date of the enactment of this Act that the
Government of
Saudi Arabia--
(1)
is fully cooperating with the United States in investigating
and
preventing terrorist attacks;
(2)
has permanently closed all Saudi-based terror organizations;
(3)
has ended any funding or other support by the Government of
Saudi Arabia
for any offshore terror organization; and
(4)
has exercised maximum efforts to block all funding from private
Saudi
citizens and entities to offshore terrorist organizations.
SEC.
5. REPORT.
(a) REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT- Not later than 6 months after the
date of the
enactment of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter until
the President
makes the certification described in section 4(c), the Secretary
of State
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report
on the
progress made by the Government of Saudi Arabia toward meeting
the
conditions described in paragraphs (1) through (4) of section
4(c).
(b)
FORM- The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be in
unclassified
form but may include a classified annex.
SEC.
6. DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.
In this Act, the term `appropriate congressional committees'
means the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee
on
International Relations of the House of Representatives
